What was William of Ockham known for?
He is commonly known for Occam’s razor, the methodological principle that bears his name, and also produced significant works on logic, physics and theology. William is remembered in the Church of England with a commemoration on 10 April.
What is the theory of nominalism?
Nominalism is the doctrine that only singular things really exist. Species, sets, common natures, general properties, shared attributes, and so on, are thus taken to have no mind-independent reality of their own.
Is Ockham a Nominalist?
Ockham was a nominalist, indeed he is the person whose name is perhaps most famously associated with nominalism. But nominalism means many different things: A denial of metaphysical universals.
Who introduced nominalism?
2. Universals. Abelard is credited as the founder of nominalism for his claim that a universal is a name (nomen) or significant word (sermo). He is also credited with inspiring a school of followers called the nominales.
Who invented Fictionalism?
Two important strands of fictionalism are modal fictionalism developed by Gideon Rosen, which states that possible worlds, regardless of whether they exist or not, may be a part of a useful discourse, and mathematical fictionalism advocated by Hartry Field.
What did William of Ockham study?
Ockham’s early schooling in a Franciscan convent concentrated on the study of logic; throughout his career, his interest in logic never waned, because he regarded the science of terms as fundamental and indispensable for practicing all the sciences of things, including God, the world, and ecclesiastical or civil …
What did William of Ockham argue?
As we have seen, Ockham argues that there is no universal essence. There is therefore no basis for an intelligible species. Each object in the world is an absolute individual and that is how we perceive it at first.
Was Aristotle a nominalist?
Accordingly Aristotle ends up being a sort of nominalist in his study of being qua being —yet a peculiar sort of nominalist . For the mental states themselves reflect the real structure of the aspects. The states of mind are not merely mental but point to, or intend, things that are not mental.